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SOME EXAMPLES OF ROYAL INTERVENTION
IN PRIVATE LITIGATION DURING THE
REIGNS OF EDWARD I, EDWARD H AND
EDWARD III
R. Randall Bridwel*
Any of Shakespeare's allusions to the legally peculiar
position of the monarch would serve to illustrate that men
were clearly aware of his unique position in relation to the
law.' But this would be merely to state a truism. The king is
the king, and everyone else is not. Yet the very existence of
some special prerogative attributable to him, which may be
discerned in the process of actual litigation, leads the curious
to attempt definition, however feebly. Since there are indeed
many ways in which one may approach the subject of the
royal prerogative, the definition of that term appears to be
as variable as the context in which one works. In what is
perhaps its broadest sense, it may be thought of as all those
relatively undefined yet real privileges and powers, the pos-
session of which distinguishes the king from all others in the
realm. It was necessary for the medieval lawyer to become
familiar with a special body of law, the droit le roi, which
became pertinent to litigation whenever the king or his in-
terests became involved in some way.2 There was in existence
during the time of early Edward I a sort of quasi-treatise on
the subject, the Prerogativa Regis, 3 dealing with legal rules
applicable to the king as tenant in chief. So the position of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. A.B., Mid-
western University; J.D., Southern Methodist University; LL.M., Harvard
University.
1. For example:
Now trust me, were it not against our laws
Against my crown, my oath, my dignity,
Which princes would they, may not disannul,
My soul should sue as advocate for thee.
Commedy of Errors (1:143)
2. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BExn, Selden Society,
Vol. 58, p. XLIV (1939).
3. Id. This is the most widely held view of the time of its origin, and was
the view adopted by Maitland in refutation of the previous theory placing the
origin of the treaties in the reign of Henry I. Id. p. lii.
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the king had at least some degree of specificity in particular
areas of the Law. It is with this sort of specific evidence that
we are here concerned. It is true that the ramifications of
the legal distinction between the king and ordinary persons
are as broad as the nature of sovereignty itself, and the treat-
ment of the subject in this, its most extreme sense is essential
and of truly constitutional significance 4 But an equally inter-
esting expression of the prerogative may be found in its effect
on private litigation, that is the specific, permissible proce-
dural and pleading rights and concurrent substantive rights
allowed the crown in actual cases.
Naturally the analysis of the prerogative on this level
offers certain possibilities for deductions concerning the actual
functional tools used by the courts and lawyers to accommo-
date the person of the king with the rights and interests given
to private parties by the common law. Evidence of the
involvement of the king in litigation takes many forms, from
seemingly gratuitous instructions to the justices, to conciliar
action directed at a specific piece of litigation, or to actual
participation by the king himself. Thus it will be necessary
to analyse to some extent the nature of the procedures involved
in the resolution of disputes. The importance which contem-
poraries may have attached to the several procedural forms
and their expressed ideas about them are important regarding
the deductions which may be drawn from each bit of evidence.
The worth of any pronouncement made in the proceedings is
certainly related to the form employed, just as dicta in an
opinion of our Supreme Court may be valued much more
highly by those seeking a practical knowledge of the law than
a resolute pronouncement of a county tribunal on some dis-
putable point.
The scope of this paper, then, will be to treat the preroga-
tive in its narrower sense by examining several instances
wherein the royal interests become involved in private ones
in various ways, and enable ourselves to consider some of the
implications of the prerogative by looking at the procedural
devices employed to resolve the cases. To determine what is
possible, or at least arguably possible, will hopefully con-
tribute something toward the understanding of the relation-
4. S. B. CHIRMS, ENGLISH CONSTITUT0NAL IDEAS IN T E FIFEENTH
CENTURY, pp. 1-62 (1936). See also SiR W xAx HoLmsworT, A ISTORY OF
ENGLIsH LAW, pp. 458-490 (4th Ed. 1935).
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ship between the common law and the crown during this
period.
I. THE KING'S INVOLVEMENT IN LITIGATION: GENERAL
POWERS AND PROCEDURES
For the sake of perspective it will be useful to examine
certain widely held concepts about the relationship of the
king to the society he governed, and thereafter proceed to
treat the factual, specific evidence on the accommodation of
his office to the everyday workings of the law.
What was the relationship between the king and the law
generally? Professor Turner cited Bracton and John of Salis-
bury as stating that the king was subject to the law and was
not one who ruled solely by will, without restraint.5 But in a
5. R. V. TURNER, THE KING AND His CouRTs, pp. 102-103 (1st Ed. 1968).
See also FazZ KERN, KINGSHIP AND LAW IN THE MIDDLE AGES, pp. 69-79 (3rd
Ed. 1970). Professor Kern's work is a sort of synthesis of many of the common
principles in the general constitutional development of the countries of Western
Europe. Id. p. xvi. Kern states that there was no legally absolute monarchy
realized in medieval conceptions of kingship. Kern seeks to describe how there
were certain limits on the free exercise of the monarch's will which were
imposed by the legal system. As Prof. Chrimes points out in the introduction,
there was apparently no difference between the different sorts of law which
might hamper the king's will. The moral and the positive, the objective and
subjective were all the same. Everyone was merely obliged to protect the 'good
old law.' Id. p. xxi. Thus it could be that it is a misleading and fruitless task
to approach the subject of legal limitations on the prerogative in the forced
terms imposed by legal categories, which during the middle ages may have been
rather irrelevant.
Professor Kern pictures a process wherein royal acts consistent with the
law are sanctioned as proper positive law by an act of the community, mani-
fested in a great variety of ways. He pictures a fluctuating consent mechanism
without a really set pattern of expression as being inherent in the medieval
constitution. See id. pp. 69-79. He says that, "Should a royal decree deviate
from the true living law that passed current among the community, the king's
power might force people to accept it as a positive law; but it was regarded as
'wrongful' law, and the people had the right to abrogate it." Cases are not
rare where a monarch condemns his own or a predecessor's decree as being
contrary to law. Id. p. 75. Kern interestingly comments that the very act of the
creation of a monarch by the coronation oath places him within and under the
legal system.
The monarch simply never possessed an unlimited right to command. Id.
p, 83. The whole process is a balancing between the ill defined yet real device
of community consent and the prerogative. Any blatant despotism would ulti-
mately fall victim to the final authority or the 'good law,' and the refusal of
the community to sanction such acts would ultimately cause them to meet
theoretical condemnation, even though the arbitrary act was a current practical
reality without immediate redress.
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very real sense the political theory of the day was rather use-
less as a guide to reality, for, according to some, the Angevin
monarchs at least seemed to rule pretty much as they saw fit
on many occasions. 6 The theoretical legal guide for the
responsible monarch seemed to provide no method of coercing
the irresponsible one to conform to proper behavior. As Pro-
fessor Turner states, there was a familiar notion in the thir-
teenth century that there existed a body of men legally
competent to judge the king, but the concept here again had
little or no practical value in the everyday workings of jus-
tice.7 Some have phrased the matter differently by contending
that the king was believed to be able to turn the law to his
own will, but he was expected to rule with an eye to justice.8
All in all it seems that men specifically addressed their
attention to the problem of the possible inconsistency between
pure monarchy and the expectations which those governed
had regarding their legal treatment. Despite the fact that no
discernible legal machinery existed for resolving this
anomaly, they nonetheless talked of certain limits on what the
king might do. The idea was there. Morever the vagueness
of the judicial machinery attributable to that idea is really no
wonder in the context of the 12th and 13th centuries or later.
Proceeding to the more specific, how were the 'rights' of
the king expressed in his courts, or conversely what expres-
sion was given to the 'rights' of those whose interests may be
contrary to those of the king? The continued involvement of
the institution of monarchy and central government with
traditional and often outworn feudal concepts gave rise to
much discussion in the king's courts. The king was the ulti-
mate lord over all the lands in the kingdom. The importance
6. R. V. TURNER, THE KING AND His COURTS, p. 103 (1st Ed. 1968),
citing JOLiFFE, ANGEVIN KINGSHIP (1955).
7. Id., p. 237. The universil s regni or baronagini which Bracton men-
tions in the famous addicio de cartis as being the legal vehicle for passing
judgment on the king certainly wasn't a conventional part of the legal system.
Indeed there exists real doubt even as to the authenticity of this part of the
manuscript, at least so far as it may be attributed to Bracton himself. There
was once the utilization of an expedient to bridle the king which could be the
factual counterpart of the theory in the addicio, during the reign of Henry III.
Id. p. 238. But this is on the level of a political controversy, a measure taken
in times of extreme angry confrontation between the king and the magnates,
rather than a recognized matter of course judicial sanction.
8. S. B. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH
CENTURY, pp. 8-9 (1936).
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss2/2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEw
of this feudal basis is the fact that, though the office of the
king was ever increasingly being regarded as one of a public
character, and not a position strictly governed by rules of
succession applicable to all estates in land, these times seemed
to provide the only legal basis for analogically determining the
legal rules for acquiring the rights to that office.9 And
equally as important, kingship was an integral part of the
system of property law under which all held and enjoyed
their lands, so the actual expression of sovereign rights must
occur to a large extent within the growing framework of laws
concerning property 'rights'.'0
However, these royal rights were not expressed in a
manner common to all litigants. Generally, the manner in
which the interests of the king were expressed in the context
of the common law gave rise to a peculiar body of law
especially applicable to the king. The Prerogativa Regis which
we have already mentioned demonstrates the concern which
lawyers had in familiarizing themselves with laws pertinent
to the rights of the king." The extent of the king's involve-
ment in litigation which is indicated by this treatise is more
than borne out in the cases during any given period. There
may be a constant variation in the motive for exerting royal
influence, especially when one contrasts the evidence of inter-
vention and interference in cases occurring under different
rulers, 12 but the strikingly pervasive influence and power is
always there.
Since it is obvious that the king is legally a special sort
of person with respect to his rights in litigation, the question
naturally arises as to how, practically speaking, these rights
are expressed. An examination of some typical ways of ex-
pressing royal interests may serve to better equip us to make
reasonable deducions about the meaning of several particular
and interesting cases which will be the subject of discussion
later. Looking at almost any accumulation of case materials
9. Id., pp. 12-13.
10. "Rights" of course merely means the expectancies upon which men felt
able to rely as a part of the evolving legal system, rather than a definable, in-
violable legal position, such as pertains to our current day ideas on constitutional
rights. The thirteenth century did not appear to be a time when there was
much theorizing about constitutional rights. See SELacr CASES IN THE COURT
OF THE KIMG'S BENCH, Selden Society, Vol. 58, p. xxxvii (1939).
11. Id., p. xliv.
12. R. V. TuRaNE, THE KING AND HIS COURTS, p. 276 (1st Ed. 1968).
[Vol. 24
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pertaining to the king's courts, it immediately becomes evi-
dent that the variety of the procedural expedients which the
king may use to vindicate his special interests is immense. 3
Taking some random, typical examples of royal intervention
running throughout the thirteenth century and into the four-
teenth, we see the king advantaged by certain marked proce-
dural concessions and rights. in a case wherein a defendant
would normally be privileged to have use of counsel, he may
have none where the king sues,14 nor may one have judgment
of the king's suit in one day.' 5 Discussions of the king's rights
occurring in the common pleas indicate that statutes have no
effect on the royal prerogative, 0 and the king is not preju-
diced by a mistake of the royal attorney made in his name.'
7
The king must be answered in whatever court he pleases,'
8
and it is doubtful whether one may rely on ordinary law
where the king is involved.19 The king personally issues
13. Speaking in terms of procedure, the general categories provided by
Professor Turner are helpful in sorting out specific instances of royal inter-
vention. He says that there are basically four ways in which the king can be
seen to interfere with the customary operation of the common law:
(1) The use of special proceedings where no possessory assize is appro-
priate;
(2) The issuance of orders contrary to rules on eligibility to plead;
(3) Commands directly overruling the usual rules of law;
(4) The use of special types of juries to take assizes. Id., p. 111.
Also there are four basic substantive categories in which we may lump
together expressions of royal interest:
(1) Instances where the king rules directly on points by law;
(2) Instances where the king interprets royal charters or grants;
(3) The king's participation in compromises or concords;
(4) Decisions affecting the punishment of wrongdoers such as the in-
creasing of one's amercements, or granting a pardon. Id., p. 123.
Though our purpose here relates to the determination of answers to sub-
stantive questions which may fall into any of the above procedural categories,
the well recognized relationship between the substantive right and the pro-
cedure employed necessitates that we keep in mind some rather general cate-
gorical concepts such as these, but seek more to analyse each case individually
rather than adopt the pigeon-holing of each case into some category as our
objective.
14. SELECT CASES IN TE COURT OF THE KiNG'S BENCH, Selden Society
Vol. 58 p. xliv, n. 4, (1939).
15. Id., n. 5. Note that the king could order suits to proceed as well as
delay them when he wished. R. V. TURNER, THE K.ING ANm His COURTS, p. 90
(1st Ed. 1968).
16. Id., n. 6; see n. 15, p. xxxviii.
17. Id. n. 7.
18. Id. n. 9.
19. Id. n. 8.
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directions in all manner of cases, sometimes instructing that a
particular procedural act be done,20 or sometimes phrasing
his orders in more general terms.2 1 These instructions often-
times issue directly from the king by word of mouth.22 The
king often claims special privileges relative to his position as
ultimate lord, claiming that transactions concerning land
which would be possible in the ordinary course of dealings
between private parties necessitates a special license from him
when his interests are thereby affected. 23 The king may post-
20. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH, Selden Society,
Vol. 56, p. xxxv, (1936), wherein Sayles points to the resumption of this
practice by Henry III after his minority, during which the practice was abated
even though orders still issued in his name. A certain constant body of rights
pertinent to the crown seems evident, though the manner of their expression
may change. See also Id. p. lxx; p. 42. "Afterwards the lord king . . . in-
structed Walter of Wimborne to withdraw from that writ." Here Edward I
was instructing his attorney to withdraw suit against an abbot for the advowson
of a church which the attorney had claimed was due Edward through one of
his predecessors, John. Edward, however, was satisfied by an assize or jury of
recognition that the abbott had the greater right.
21. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH, Selden Society,
Vol. 58, p. 22 (1938). "And on this there came the lord king himself who
clearly understood that deed, and at once ordered speedy justice to be done to
the aforesaid Agnes."
22. Id., p. 22; 57, where Edward I gave instructions by word of mouth
to Gilbert de Thornton to forgive the trespass of one appointed to deliver goal.
The trespass was occasioned by the mismanagement of records which caused
the detention of one already acquitted of an alleged offense; Id. Vol. 58, pp. xliv,
5, where a jurisdictional dispute arose between the clergy and Edward I over
Master Wynand, accused of poisoning another man in Snodland. "And after-
wards the lord king at Eastry in the county of Kent after Christmas in the
twenty-second year of his reign enjoined Gilbert of Thornton and master John
Lovel by word of mouth that, if the prior of Canterbury, to whom the afore-
said Wynand was handed over, wished to hand that aforesaid Wynand back
again to the lord king, they were to receive the aforesaid Wynand . . ." Id.,
Vol. 57, p. lxxii.
23. A frequent claim of this sort pertains to advowsons. It is claimed on
behalf of the king that to alienate a fee to which a royal advowson was attached
without special license from the king was contrary to his special prerogative,
and we find language indicating that if permission had not been obtained, the
fine should be quashed as being a disinheritance of the king. SELECT CASES
IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH, Selden Society, Vol. 58, p. xlvii (1939).
Id. Vol. 55, p. 48. "And Walter of Wimborne says for the lord king that the
aforesaid fine ought not to harm the lord king. For he says that the lord king
has a special prerogative attached to his crown, namely, that it is not lawful
for anyone to alienate his fee without his special license, nor was it usual or
permissible for a fine of such alienations to be levied without his consent, it
cannot be prejudicial to him in anything, rather shall it be deservedly quashed as
7
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pone actions against those in his service,24 and any pleas con-
cerning charters granted by the king may be decided by him
alone.25 Just as Turner tells us was the practice under John
and Henry 111,26 special concessions appear to be made to
important people to have their cases heard before the king
27
in the reign of Edward I, and nothing indicates that the prac-
tice was abated thereafter.
So both in theory and in practice, the king seems to be
an omnipresent arbiter over the decisions of the courts in his
kingdom, possibly even unto pre-conquest days. 28 Professor
Sayles sees the growth of the practice of intervening in local
or private affairs in the courts as a rather continuous process
dating from about the time of Henry 11,29 and, as the above
evidence illustrates, the exact scope of the interests vindicated
by such intervention as well as the methods of accomplishing
it are rather vague. This brings us to the more specific in-
quiry about evidence of possible substantive or procedural
limits on the prerogative as it is exercised in private litigation.
II. SOURCES OF EVIDENCE ON THE SCOPE OF THE PREROGATIVE
Having been impressed with the seemingly boundless
involvement of the king in private litigation, we now face the
narrower or more specific task of seeking to sift out certain
discriminating evidence which bears on the extent of the
prerogative. Relatedly we must examine some of the osten-
sible limits on the procedural expedients which the monarch
may use in expressing the prerogative. We are in a way
attempting to scan the voluminous records of the day to day
royal participation and intervention in the copious litigation
in the various courts, simultaneously weigh or evaluate the
levied to the disinheritance of the lord king against the prerogative which the
lord king and his ancestors have so far used."
See Id., Vol. 57, p. 79, concerning alienation "without the lord king's will."
See also id., p. lxxi.
24. R. V. TURNER, THE KING AND His COURTS, pp. 79-89 (1st Ed. 1968).
25. Id., p. 39.
26. Id., p. 276.
27. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH, Seldon Society,
Vol. 57, p. lxxii (1938).
28. Id., Vol. 55, pp. xvii-xviii.
29. Id., p. xx. See pp. xxxiv-xxxv, illustrating the recrudescence of the
involvement of the king in litigation by Henry III after the period of his
minority. The resort to unusual or special procedural expedients to express
certain royal interests seems to be a custom or practice incapable of being
eradicated by a period of royal minority.
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manner in which the prerogative is effectuated, and attempt
to spot certain extremes which do not appear to fall within the
day to day course of judicial business. So we must adopt
certain criteria for weighing the evidence found which will
make each bit relate to the others. Put another way, we must
simultaneously weight the manner in which the royal interest
is effectuated against the pronouncement about that interest
which it seems to make. Sometimes the royal prerogative
is vindicated by one speaking on behalf of the king,
especially a royal attorney, or less directly perhaps by
one who is only a private party but claims certain procedural
and related substantive rights because of the presence of a
demonstrable royal interest in the litigation, without the
resolution of which the court should not proceed.30 Sometimes
the king's representative contends that decisions ought to be
based on the effectuation of the prerogative, 31 and sometimes
the king himself instructs the court to rule in a way that
will effectuate it.32 Sometimes the case itself will for some
reason be referred to the king in order to secure his advice
before the justices proceed, or on rarer occasions the whole
case is actually decided before the king himself sitting with
an afforced council of magnates or important and learned
advisors.38 Sometimes glimpses of the possible limits of the
prerogative are caught in the often extreme allegations of a
private party to the litigation,34 or even in the sometimes
ambitious claims of the king's representatives. 35 We must
attempt to evaluate the truth of each claim or contention by
examining the outcome of the case and its compatability with
these allegations made on behalf of the royal interests, taking
into account possible alternative reasons for the decision
which would render the contentions on the prerogative per-
haps less reliable.
Naturally an attempt to make observations on such a
slippery subject must be based on certain initial assumptions
about the source of the material used. Though these initial
assumptions may themselves be debatable, I feel that certain
considerations tend to justify the use of the several cases in
30. Id., Vol. 57, p. 67.
31. Id., Vol. 55, p. 48.
32. Id., Vol. 58, pp. lii-liii.
33. Id., Vol. 57, p. 67.
34. Id.
35. Id., Vol. 55, p. 54.
[Vol. 24
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the next section herein which were chosen for analysis, and
perhaps make the deductions which may be drawn from these
cases of some worth. I have chosen to center my investigation
around several cases of different sorts arising in the reigns
of Edward I, Edward II and Edward 11I.36 The considera-
tions justifying the choice of this material indicate that it
has some discriminating power as to an assessment of the
scope of the royal prerogative expressed in actual intervention
in judicial business. First we know that the debates on the
subject of the royal prerogative took place almost exclusively
in the court of common pleas for some reason.3 7 The Year
Books paid hardly any attention to the king's bench, which
was the court especially engaged in watching after the king's
interests. Royal matters and rights definitely came up for
consideration in the course of adjudication there much more
frequently than elsewhere.3 8 One gets the feeling of a body
of justices which seem to be remarkably well acquainted with
the nature and operation of the prerogative, despite the fact
that it is a problem that is at once theoretical and concrete,
in the sense that its effectuation demands positive action in
the course of actual litigation. It should not seem so unreason-
able to suppose that the group of royal judicial servants in the
king's bench obtained much the same knack or feel for the
presence of the elusive prerogative in specific procedural
problems as a present day practitioner in some specialized
area of law obtains in his particular field, as is the case in
admiralty or bankruptcy practice. The surviving records do
not, and cannot, explain things exactly as litigants or judges
saw them, just as a current day treatise on admiralty, for
example, can not endow a casual reader with any sensitivity
to the possibility of a lien priority dispute, for instance, lurk-
ing in the background of a series of maritime transactions.
36. Translation of these cases taken selectively from the coram rege rolls
of this period are made available in volumes 55, 57, 58, 74, 76, and 82 of the
Selden Society publications, and the introductory material relative to these cases
substantiates the choice of the case material as a proper means of investigating
the subject of the royal prerogative. The primary emphasis on these cases
relates to weight, rather than suggesting the total exclusion of other case
material, for certain discussions of the prerogative in the common pleas are a
helpful source of information on the subject, and are discussed later herein.
37. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH, Selden Society,
Vol. 58, p. xliv (1939).
38. Id.
10
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The general practitioner would be blind to the problem that
would leap out at an experienced proctor. The admiralty law-
yer knows what admiralty law means in reality, and moreover
he knows what maritime commerce does and appreciates the
factual counterparts to the theoretical words of law embodied
in cases and treatises. So it must have been to some extent at
least with those who handled much of the king's judicial
business, who knew his wishes, his 'rights', who knew him.
The justices in the common pleas seem to face the dilemma
of the general practitioner with a specialized admiralty prob-
lem. Their discussions are valuable in educating us, the sur-
viving generations of the curious, as to some of the ideas
people entertained about the prerogative, but then pronounce-
ments doubtless do not represent the skilled and sensitive
actions of those who, as it were, had a sort of special training
with the prerogative.3 9
Also it was natural for the king to receive as favored a
treatment at the hands of the justices as was practically pos-
sible, since they were his men.40 Thus we must take any limits
which they feel forced to place on the expression of the royal
interest as serious, valuable evidence on the extent of the
prerogative. Further, it seems that the involvement of the
king's bench with the interests of the Crown culminated in a
procedural custom concomitant to this specialization. By the
latter half of the reign of Edward II, it became the practice
to separate the records of pleas between purely private parties
and those affecting the interests of the crown. The peculiarly
lcommon' pleas and those concerning the king were regarded
as entirely different matters, and the latter, or 'rex role',
became a separate portion of the rolls of the king's bench. 41
39. For the sake of comparison certain examples of the discussions in the
common bench will be discussed later, so as to more thoroughly canvass opinion
and practice on the subject. The term 'private litigation', with which we profess
to be primarily involved, should be taken to include the examples wherein the
king or his representative is the complaining party. Such cases represent an
involvement of the king in private matters or transactions, just as where the
king intervenes or interferes with litigation already in process between two or
more private parties. In both cases he is expressing his own interests as
contrasted with private ones, which parties have sought to effectuate through
otherwise seemingly legal private transactions.
40. See n. 37, surpra.
41. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE ING'S BENCH, Selden Society,
Vol. 57, p. xxviii (1938).
[Vol. 24
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Indeed, during this early developmental period, when the
jurisdictional concepts attributable to different branches of
the curia regis were evolving, the real distinction between
pleas in the common bench and those in the court of the king's
bench was one between cases of a purely private nature and
those that somehow affected the king.4 2 The jurisdictional
separation based on the distinction between purely civil and
criminal matters was a development which really only began
in the mid-fourteenth century.43 The distinction between pri-
vate and crown interests as a criterion for the assertion of
jurisdiction by the common bench on one hand and the king's
bench on the other is not hard and fast, however, but should
rather be viewed in this fluctuating and formative age as a
recognized tendency, and not an absolute rule.
We may, then, with caution, take the judicial actions of
the king's bench as perhaps being entitled to more weight as
being the most accurate indications of what the royal prerog-
ative in its litigational aspect actually meant to men then. We
can therefore feel justified in focusing most of our attention
on the king's bench side of the curia regis is searching for
the most discriminating evidence about the king's prerogative
rights. In doing so, we may soon see that within this sphere
of interest there are certain procedural sub-categories, which
further enable us to distinguish between cases furnishing
insights into the royal prerogative to an even greater degree.
More specifically, cases affecting royal interests may
be decided in several different ways, and the manner employed
says much about the matter stated. The king's judicial serv-
ants were, as we have noted, 'his' men, no matter where they
sat and no matter if he supervised them directly or not.44
Regarding the different permutations of the judicial arm of
the king's bureaucracy, Bracton indicates that no vital dis-
tinction existed between them as relates to their subservience
to the king.45 They were all part of the curia regis, and were
expedients utilized as the case demanded. However, though
all appeared to be directed toward the same end, a different
attitude about the cases coming before a particular arm of
the curia regis-the council-appears obvious. Evidence ap-
42. Id., p. xxxviii.
43. Id., pp. xxxxii-xxxviii.
44. R. V. TuREt, Tim KING AND His Coughs, p. 141 (lst Ed. 1968).
45. Id., p. 168.
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pears conclusive that there were many meetings of the king's
council that were not a part of the sessions of the king's
bench. 48 The fact that contemporaries saw a distinct differ-
ence between the two naturally suggests a difference in func-
tion, and such seems to be the case. Though a matter might
come before the council in several different ways, its presence
there normally denoted a problem involving crown rights,
great people or difficult problems about which the king's
decision was assumed tp be necessary.47 The tradition seems
to have been of long standing by the fourteenth century that
great or novel problems were to be threshed out with the
benefit of the superior advice available from the afforced
court, the king's council. 48 We may expect then, allowing for
the exceptions inherent in an age less exact and predictable
in its legal process than our own, that cases generally of crown
interest will more than likely be initially before the king's
bench or in cases of great crown interest, before the council.
Naturally cases may be supervised by the council after initial
assumption by the king's bench where crown interests become
obvious and vital.
In seeking to choose and analyse several different cases
which may be said to reveal something of the scope or limits
of the royal prerogative in litigation, we seem to be faced
with a dual task, toward which the preceeding information
has been accumulated and should be applied by reference.
That is, we are given in the various cases the written state-
ments about or pertaining to the king's prerogative, and,
46. SELECt CASES IN THE COURT OF THE ICNG'S BENCH, Selden Society,
Vol. 57, pp. lxvii-lxx (1938). "There can be no doubt that the king's bench and
council are distinguishable bodies."
47. Id., p. lxvii. Actions may be transferred by the king's bench to the
council when to proceed without consulting the king would somehow prejudice
him.
See id., Vol. 58, p. cxxxv, for a certification of a problem to the council
by the justices of the king's bench. The council interfered with all manner of
judicial proceedings, but noticeably interfered the most with the work of the
king's bench. This was so because, as Professor Sayles says, it was indeed his
bench and was to look after his business. Id., p. lxvi. This further confirms
our observation that it is before the king's bench and his council that we should
look most closely for indications about the extent of the prerogativa.
To be sure, there were meetings of the king's bench which were afforced
by other justices, but these were not council meetings since they required the
attendance of advisors who had no judicial status. Id., p. lxviii.
48. Turner notes that Bracton knew of this practice. See R. V. TuRNER,
THE KING AND His COURTS, p. 168 (Ist Ed. 1968).
[Vol. 24
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assuming all other things to be equal, we must unravel certain
semantic difficulties that always surround an attempt to
discern the factual counterparts which one using a certain
combination of words sought to symbolize by those words.
Even if the words or symbols, were used impartially and in a
dispassionate attempt to describe the nature of the preroga-
tive as it stood at the time of the writing, we would still be
faced with great difficulties in interpretation.49 But descrip-
tion for posterity was not usually the motivation for the state-
ments of those who provide us with the almost singular source
of information on the prerogative as we are approaching it.
We must consider the context of the words and their purpose,
as well as what might be considered their ordinary meaning,
if such a thing exists. As we shall see, the speaking party
may be a royal attrney, intent on vindicating his master's
interests, as he may be a disappointed suitor whose only
claim in the contested matter may depend upon the involve-
ment of the king, or his willingness to exert or abate royal
power on behalf of the litigant. Descriptions of the limits of
the prerogative given by these two may not be exactly com-
patable.
Next the procedural context must be accounted for in
assessing the weight of the words employed. As our introduc-
tion indicated, the designation and purpose of the judicial
machinery employed-the king's bench alone, the king's coun-
cil, the king himself instructing the court, or whatever form
employed-must be viewed simultaeously with what each
case purports to say. We should not create a hard and fast
scale between the king in his council coupled with an unequivo-
cal pronouncement by the king on the subject of his preroga-
49. One is reminded of Hayakawa's demonstration illustrating the difficulty
of conveying meaningful, discriminating communication, even where the words
used are employed with no other purpose ulterior to the factual description of
an object. He suggested that one take a bag of thirty or so similar oranges,
each of which by nature is somewhat different from the others, but also,
assuming no extraordinary markings, is quite like all the others. Then he
should proceed to utilize all his verbal descriptive and linguistic skill in
describing a single one of those oranges, place it back among its fellows, and
then hand the whole bag and his wonderful biography of the chosen fruit to a
second party with instructions to read, then select the orange which was so
carefully interviewed. Not an easy task when one's only purpose is to relate
the facts, which is not commonly the sole motivation behind many of the com-
ments in our recorded cases. See S. I. HAYAAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT
AND ACriON.
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tive, running down from this extreme to the bottom of the
table, where is listed the outcry of a private litigant in the
king's bench, unattended or uninstructed by the king, but at
least this suggests an attitude which we may discreetly use
to some purpose.
Some have said that the king's involvement or participa-
tion in what we may term 'justice' during the Angevin period
was just what a hasty examination of the multifarious ways
in which the king could intervene in judicial affairs would
indicate-a rather uncontrolled, personally motivated effort
directed toward personal gain and self aggrandizement.50
Others seem generally to feel that the tradition prior to
Edward I was not so black, and that, though a monarch such
as John actually cared little for providing justice for his sub-
jects and was all too willing to avail himself of the financial
benefits of judicial meddling, the intervention occasioned did
not work a wholesale alteration of the judicial system. 5' More-
over the recognizable tradition did not entail massive interven-
tion in judicial processes.5 2 Professor Turner openly states
that evidence shows that the king did not intervene in judicial
matters as a matter of whim, but rather his actions were a
companion to customary law, and a useful leavening for its
smooth operation.
58
Just what was the tradition of royal intervention as we
move into the time of Edward I? Obviously the answer is
unclear and disputed, and we hear many voices urging dif-
ferent and contrary positions. John himself at least once
openly insisted that his command should take precedence
over the custom of the realm. 54 And yet we hear his son's
50. J. E. A. JoLimn, ANEWV1N KINGSHIP (1970). Professor Joliffe feels
that "every membrance of the curia regis rolls" reveals the evidence of royal
intervention which is employed along no set pattern but is aimed at many
divergent purposes personal to the monarch. Id., p. 58.
51. R. V. TURNER, THE KING AND His CouRTs, pp. 119-120, 268-276 (1st
Ed., 1968).
52. Id., pp. 119-120.
53. Id., "Although there is no great evidence that John had any deep
respect for custom or tradition, there is no more support for the view that he
dictated procedures contrary to custom solely on the basis of personal whim.
Neither the commands of John nor those of Henry III indicated any con-
ception that the king was not bound by law. The king's will was not regarded
as something above the law but as a vital companion of the law, something
necessary to regulate the machinery of royal justice."
54. Id., p. 104.
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contemporaries saying that this cannot be so, and in one case,
in 1242, the justices openly agree.5 5 Where this occurs, how-
ever, it is interesting to note that we have no recorded ex-
pression of the king's will, and given the tenor of this period,
we may suspect that it was not offended. But, contrarily, this
case intimating some resistance to the royal prerogative posed
by the common law has a counterpart in a later time, under
Edward II, wherein the king's will is openly known through
express orders, and yet to our amazement the judges hold
firm anyway.56 Perhaps the common law had toughened up
considerably between 1242 and 1329.
55. Turner provides several such cases, one of which, occurring in 1219,
involved a plea by the prior of Hospitalers that, in regard to a royal writ
supposedly supporting the seisin of the defendant in the prior's action of novel
deseisin, the writ, if authentic, was contra legem terrae et conietudinem regni.
Id., p. 72. No result is given on the plea rolls.
On another occasion the royal judges, in 1242, dismissed a suit on the
grounds that the grant in question was contrary to the common law and the
king "had no wish to change" the customary law. Id., pp. 110-111. The plaintiff
countered by petitioning the king to proceed, since "the king himself is above
all law." Id. The judges, however, had taken action, and their action seems
to imply a much more rigid or 'tough' common law vis a vis the royal preroga-
tive than one normally assumes was present. It instinctively seems hard to
imagine such a decision being struck off totally out of harmony with what the
king would wish for the case and with not thought to his interests or desires.
Offhand, one might hazard that such decisions are usually not a cursory
pronouncement of "it can't be done", relegating the king to the position of any-
one else who bends the law, but were rather made by men who knew in advance
how it would sit with the king. Turner flatly states that this was not a time
when we had an independent judiciary or a notion that such existed apart from
the necessity of knowing the king's will when his rights were involved. Id.,
p. 270.
56. This occurred in the exchequer in 1329. The abbess of Benedictine
nunnery at Elstow had obtained a decision in the king's council in parliament
that she might obtain judgment in the exchequer upon her cause. This case
involved freehold property and the defendants claimed that to proceed in this
Court would be in contravention of the law and custom of the realm. The court
agreed and went no further. The abbess complained to the king, who told the
court that "because it is not right that pleas and processes began by writs
authorized in parliament by us and our council should be hindered in this
fashion," they should proceed with the case. The court, however, went on
adjourning the case until the record was ordered to the chancery for deposition
there, the king seemingly feeling that further pressure to continue was not
called for. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENcH, Selden Society,
Vol. 76, p. lxxxv (1957). Is this further evidence concerning our suspicion that
the royal prerogative is seen most easily in the king's bench, in that the judges
here were uncertain? Or were they certain as to what the prerogative called
for, yet persistent any-vay? The decision from the king in council and the
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Having made mention of the theoretical extent of the
king's prerogative, examined some typical methods through
which it was expressed, and considered the implications of the
employment of one legal expedient as opposed to another,
naturally one begins to question whether any guidelines or
extreme limits may be discerned in the expression of royal
interests. So the examination of some specific cases is in
order, and may help clarify our impressions about the drift
of the prerogative during this period.
III. CASES IN THE COMMON PLEAS
Since the methods of intervention in private litigation
employed by the king are the same in both the king's bench
and the common pleas, the discussions in the common pleas
are an interesting source of information on generally held
ideas concerning the prerogative. The statements made in
some of the more thorough discussions can be weighed against
the more authoritative king's bench material to be discussed
subsequently.
In 1312 the king brought a writ of quare impedit against
Thomas of Hothwayt,517 and while this writ was pending, Hugh
of Courtenay brought a like action against this same Thomas,
and thereby recovered the presentation of the contested
advowson by judgment. But because the king had taken action
the Ordinaries would not accept Courtenay's presentation. So
Courtenay brought a bill or petition in parliament. Certain
justices were assigned to do him right and he was allowed a
writ in the king's bench.58 The attorney for Thomas attempted
to point out that one Isabel held her seisin on recovery from
Gilbert, the father of Thomas, who was dead at the time of
judgment. Thus her judgment was based on error so that the
court should examine it in assessing the king's rights. The
court, per Brabezon, C.J., replied that the king has nought to
do with writs between private persons and that, 'by reason
of his prerogative', it is sufficient that he merely allege that
personal instructions from the king seem to make the situation pretty clear.
So the resistance to unequivocally expressed royal will seems to come more
from a reliance on the law and custom than from uncertainty. The objectionable
qualities of the prerogative as here expressed seem to be most in their minds.
57. Year Books 5 Edward II, 1311-1312, Selden Society, Volume 31, p. 131
(1915).
58. Id., p. 130. The king based his claim upon the fact that his tenant in
chief died seised of the advowson, and thus it came into his hands.
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his tenant died seised.59 However, the court emphasized the
fact that Isabel made a presentation, apparently believing her
title good, and that this was sufficient to affirm the king's
possession, especially since Courtenay could sue the advow-
son out of the king's hands as heir of Isabel, but had not done
so. Thus, since he had not done so, the king ought to have
judgment.60
This was therefore not a case where the prerogative
flatly overrode rightful claims based on the common law, but
here the king in the last analysis merely claimed a certain
advantageous position in a series of preferences allowed by
the common law. Isabel's action was sufficient to overcome
the alleged defect in her title at common law, and this title
would withstand attack based on the initial error in judgment
made when title was first acquired. A later suit by Courtenay
could displace the king's position, but since it has not been
instituted the king has the superior right in relation to
Thomas. The judges seemed to view the problem actually
as a question of priorities allowed by the common law, rather
than one of the prerogative versus the common law.
Later, in 1313, the king brought a writ of quare impedit
against William of the Boys (du Boys), alleging that William
had disturbed his presentation of an advowson. 61 The king
alleged that the advowson was his because Robert, former
Bishop of Canterbury, was seised of the advowson and gave
the church to his clerk, by whose death it became void. He
also alleged that it became void during the vacancy of the
See of Canterbury and came into the lands of the king in
guardianship, so that he should now present it.
The reply to these allegations was that the Church had
not become vacant because of the death of Simon, the clerk,
and thereupon the king sought to vary his title, alleging that
the voidance of the see was the basis of his claim. The wordy
reply made on the king's behalf seemed to say that the fact
of the voidance was the real basis of the cause and how it
came about is of no consequence, so that any apparent varia-
tion should not prove fatal.6 2 The opposition thought that the
59. Id., p. 131.
60. Id., p. 132.
61. Year Books 7 Edward II, 1313-1314, Selden Society, Volume 39, p. 64
(1922).
62. Id., p. 65.
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change from dependence on the death of one occupying the
church to the vacancy of the see was a variation in the right
of action itself. As to that, Scrope, J. allowed that, "He
that sueth for the king cannot omit or change aught to the
king's possible disadvantage, for he is not in the position of
an attorney. Any stranger may appear on behalf of the king,
and if he made a slip, the king's right ought not to be lost."63
Inge, J. felt that the right of action, dependent upon the fact
of the voidance, remained just as it had been before, and
Bereford, C.J., in basic agreement stated that "no one would
believe that the king could change his count or make a differ-
ent count under one and the same writ, but he can make this
change because he is not changing aught that is of the essence
of his right of action; and if this were not so, he could not
make the change." (emphasis added).G04
This, however, did not settle matters. The defendant's
attorney stated that such a writ "is not based upon the com-
mon law, for the common law alloweth a man to retain his
benefice notwithstanding that he hath received a dignity or
some other benefice. The right of action therefore upon which
the king supporteth his count is founded rather upon the
counsel of the spiritual clerks than upon the common law, and
consequently we do not think that our lord the king ought to
be, or will wish to be, answered in such a counting."6 5 The
defendant's attorney continued to claim that a voidance can
only be occasioned by a suit in court Christian, and when a
church is there declared void, a patron's right to present
accrues. Then only will such a writ for disturbance of that
right exist. To reverse this sequence would be 'to put the cart
before the horse'. 6 Further, "The church doth not become
void by cession. Nought that he hath said proveth it to be void.
Is the defendant deprivable on that ground? He is not. But
say they he is deprived. First get the church void, and then,
if anyone disturb you, bring your quare impedit, but the king
is now bringing the writ against us who are parson. If the
plaintiff were any other than the king he could not use such
a writ against us. ' 67 Clearly this implies that even the king
ought not to be able to bend the common law this far. If we
63. Id.
64. Id., p. 66.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id., pp. 66-67.
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accept the defendant's exposition of the proper procedure,
we cannot help but feel that some element of the common
law has been abused. Yet the judges themselves see the prob-
lem as a rather harmless pleading alteration which does not
go to the cause of action. They are not outwardly deciding
against the defendant on the issues which he outlines, but
seem merely to visualize the issue in a different way. The
real point is that the position sought by both parties appears
to be one of accommodation to the common law. Nobody seems
to feel or admit that the presence of the king as litigant should
abrogate the common law. Rather there appears to be a
disagreement as to just what the law is in such a case. The
defendant feels that the law is abused by the king because
he sees the law differently rather than because he alone feels
that the king is powerless to override the law. All profess to
agree on the latter point, but disagreement centers around
what constitutes overriding the common law.68
68. It is interesting to note a 1312 case wherein the parties were contesting
the proper jurisdiction of the court in which the cause was to be heard, and
produced conflicting charters to support their claims. The defendant claimed
the right to be impleaded only in the court of Shepway by a franchise granted
by Edward I. Bereford, C. J., related how formerly the Barons of the Cinque
Ports put forward a charter from the king allowing them to be impleaded only
in their own franchise court of Shipway. Despite letters from the king for the
judges to stay their hands, they proceeded anyway and held such a charter
contrary to reason. Bereford then stated: "And we too, now, will rule that
this charter which you have newly gotten, and that maketh Denge Marsh ...
to be of the franchise of the Cinque Ports, it contrary to reason? Then Bereford
instructed that the parties should petition the king for clarification, since they
both had royal charters. Year Books, 5 Edward II, 1312 Selden Society, p. 17
(1915). Thus the king's position certainly was not unassailable, as the de-
fendant in the case involving William du Boys feared. See n.64, supra.
In another interesting case involving a procedural precedent favorable to
the defendant, in 1313, a writ of quare impedit was brought for the king, who
claimed that an advowson was his of right because one Harry of Guilford died
seised of a manor to which the advowson was appendant, and the same Harry
held of the king in chief. The defendant claimed that Harry had enfeoffed him
of the manor before his death. In response, the king's attorney alleged that the
lands had come to the king while the church was vacant and thereafter Harry's
heir, John, sued the manor out of the king's hands. So the king need not plead
as to the defendant's contention, as his claim should actually await judgment
against John, who is now seised. However, the answer was commanded by
Bereford, C. 3., who agreed that, for the king to make out his case, he must
allege seisin when the church became void. Yet the king's attorney was now
indicating that the defendant had been in possession and was himself wrongfully
disseised, so that any answer due him should await judgment against his
disseisor, wherein the defendant's claim may well be found to be bad. The
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In 1315 a writ of quare impedit was brought on behalf
of the king alleging the seisin of Edward I, his father, of
an advowson, the presentation of which was currently disturb-
ed by the defendant.6 9 The defendant pleaded that the present
king's grandfather, Henry III, had granted the advowson to
him, and that documentary evidence of the possession and
right of the defendant was seized into the king's hands dur-
ing the reign of the subsequent king, Edward I. Edward I
had allegedly assumed possession of all of the lands during
a period when the defendant and his religious order were
being suppressed by the Pope. The defendant alleged that he
should not answer until the king looked at the charter from
Harry, which he alone could interpret, and also should be given
a change to return the other documentary proof of the defend-
ant's title. The natural objection was that the king should
not be put in a worse position than a subject by allowing the
charter of a grandfather to defeat the seisin of a father. Also
he should not be prejudiced for the defendant's failure to sue
for the documents. Nonetheless, the defendant persisted, and
Bereford, C .J. attempted to reserve the king's relationship
with the defendant, stating that "If you could appeal to a legal
principle what you say would be well enough, but against the
king, who is above the law, you cannot rely on legal prin-
ciples."
70
Yet the same legally superior position was urged on
behalf of lhe defendant, who claimed that, regarding the
charter of King Harry on which he relied, "There is Inge
[referring to a justice on the bench] who can judge any other
than the king, but the king's charter may not be judged by
any other than the king, for he is without peer and is above
all law, etc." 71
A subsequent note from the record discloses that the
defendant himself later alleged that the man named by Ed-
king's attorney then cautiously threw out the insinuation that to command an
answer in such a case would be improper, and that he had never before seen a
case in which such had been ordered.
But Bereford, perhaps looking down his nose and speaking severly, replied:
"I have seen it; and so you must reply to him." Year Books, 6 Edward II,
1313, Selden Society, Volume 43, pp. 40-41 (1926).
69. Year Books, 8 Edward II, 1314-15, Selden Society, Vol. 41, p. 73
(1924).
70. Id., p. 74.
71. Id., p. 75.
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ward I, father of the present king, was never admitted or in-
stituted into the church. A jury was summoned to answer this
question, but the defendant disappeared and thus suffered
judgment.
72
We here have from the bench a repetition of the familiar
cliche that the king is above law. Yet any record of extra-
legal behavior attributable to the king is absent, as it always
seems to be. The literal meaning of that cliche obtains here no
more than elsewhere, and, though the king's legal position is
different from that of others, we certainly do not see that law
is irrelevant to him. In fact his right here as elsewhere is
asserted in a conventional procedural fashion, and the defend-
ant has merely somehow gone amiss in his suit. He has not
called on the normally applicable law and found it to no avail
against the king. After one postponement in the case, Inge, J.,
states rather admonitorily that "Our Lord the king has
brought his writ and shown how he has a right of action,
but you persist in running away from and avoiding any an-
swer to the king's plea of right by talking about charters and
confirmations, the existence of which you allege, and other
defenses which you assert to be in the possession of the king,
but of all that you give no proof to the court."
73
Clearly the defendant had his chance, the day in court
allowed by the common law, even though the king himself was
plaintiff.
IV. CASES IN THE KING'S BENCH
In 1279 the king was suing Gilbert de Clare, earl of
Gloucester and Hertford, for the manors of Portland and
Wyke Regis. Gilbert alleged that these manors were given
by Edward's father, Henry III, to Gilbert's father, Richard,
to be held at the king's will.75 Gilbert alleged that afterwards
King Henry sent word to his father that the prior of St.
Swithin's was to have peaceful possession of the land. Rich-
ard, his father, acceded to the king's wishes and gave the land
72. Id., p. 79.
73. Id., p. 76.
74. SELECTED CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KiNG'S BENCH, Selden Society,
Volume 55, p. 52 (1936) ; Id., Volume 58, p. xlix, wherein Sayles refers to the
case as being "one of the most interesting to be found on the plea rolls."
75. Id., Volume 55, p. 54. "[T]he aforesaid king Henry committed the
aforesaid manors to the aforesaid Richard, his father, to be kept as long as it
pleased the aforesaid king Henry."
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to the prior. But subsequenly the prior enfeoffed Richard of
the manors in fee, and on Richard's death Gilbert inherited
them on the same terms. Further, since the present king
founds his action upon the former grant of Henry, allegedly
based upon custody, and since that grant had been modified
by the enfeoffment of Richard by the prior, then the writ so
founded need not in the earl's opinion be answered.
7 6
John le Fauconer, the king's attorney, thereupon alleged
that the king is not bound by the laws and need not use ordi-
nary writs. 7 The prior had no more than Richard had for-
merly anyway, so the grant was not really modified. 78 The
king's attorney noted that this same action had begun under
Henry in 1269, and that they were using the same suit in the
present action, only with the name 'Henry' replaced with
'Edward'.70 Then, in a highly unusual claim concerning the
propriety of the king's writ, the king's attorney argued that
#ie advisors of Henry utilized all their wisdom and skill in
in framing the writ for Henry, and since these men had no
equal in the kingdom at the current time, there should be
no objection capable of quashing the writ.80 Richard had
nothing but custody of the land, and it actually was not even
necessary for the king to plead in order to resume custody
76. Id. "[H]e prays judgment whether he ought to answer that writ,
founded upon the grant made to the aforesaid Richard, his father, at the
pleasure of the aforesaid king Henry, for this grant had been altered by the
same King Henry, as is aforesaid" (altered by the confirmation of Richard's
possession in fee).
77. Id., p. 54. "One is that the lord king is not bound by the laws and
has no necessity to use ordinary writs, rather he is able, as his predecessors
were accustomed; to use any writs formed to recover these things which were
seized from them. . . ." One of the earl's previous exceptions in a similar
action for the same land, brought in 1269, had been that the great men of the
realm had hitherto observed that writs should be common to everyone. Id.,
p. xlix; p. 56. Hence the above reply from the king's attorney.
78. Id., p. 55.
79. Id. "[Niothing being changed except the name 'Edward' in place of
'Henry'.
80. Id. "[T]his writ was framed by the advice of the magnates and those
learned in law who were of the council of the aforesaid Henry. These men
applied their wisdom and all their pains and framed that writ as that which
could be quashed by no exception, wherefore, since there are not now in the
kingdom any men of such outstanding diligence or wisdom as those who framed
that writ, it does not seem to him that any exception put forward by the
aforesaid Gilbert ought to be admitted to quash the aforesaid writ."
[Vol. 24
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of the land, according to the king's representative. The king
was allegedly using such a writ only out of kindness.8 '
We are left without any resolution of the case, but the
contensions of the parties are interesting. In the first part of
the protracted litigation, the king's attorney flatly stated that
all writs were established for the entire community except the
king.82 However in the first piece of this litigation, occurring
in 1269, the attorney seemed to say that the king never uses
ordinary writs.8 3 Yet, in the second phase of the dispute, he
merely seems to say that the king need not do so. 8 4 But his
general references to the king's superior position in litigation
implies that this may be a minor point, as his claims for the
king go so far as to allege that he is just not bound by the laws
at all. 5 Certainly the king is allowed to formulate writs
especially designed to serve his interests, and those of justice8"
anywhere in the English realm. But it seems that he could
also use ordinary ones.8 7 To say that he may exceed the norm,
but cannot duplicate it, would doubtless seem as illogical then
as it does now. We see also that the extreme claims made for
the king's authority are made by his own representatives
here. This is somewhat different from the case where a pri-
vate party benefitted by the king's grace makes extravagant
claim for his power.8 8 Yet they are nonetheless extreme
claims and seem to be patently out of line with the drift of
practice regarding the king's prerogative to this date.89 Fur-
ther, the claim is general, theoretical, and very vague. It says
nothing of the factual do's or don'ts touching the king in liti-
gation, but rather states in capacious language an extreme
which, taking its meaning at face value, we must be inclined
to reject. That is, the fact that the king simply was not "above
law" in the extreme sense of the term is evidenced by the utili-
zation of ordinary legal process by his representatives to se-
81. Id., p. 55.
82. Id., p. 56.
83. Id. "[B]ecause he does not plead at any time by common writs."
84. Id., p. 54. "[H]as not necessity to use ordinary writs."
85. Id.
86. Id., Volume 55, p. 57, where the king's attorney introduced evidence
that the kings in times past were wont to use whatever writs were necessary.
87. Id., Volume 58, p. xlix.
88. Id., Volume 58, p. xlviii, citing Volume 57, p. 68.
89. Witness the aforementioned dismissal of a suit based on a grant by
King John, as it was said to be contrary to the common law. R. V. TuRNER,
THE KING AND His COURTS, p. 110 (1st Ed. 1968). See also pp. 119-120.
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cure his rights. If he was truly "above law", he would merely
have sent some official to forcibly reclaim the property and
be done with it. But, though his position is admittedly special,
he often expresses his interests through court processes, just
as anyone else would do. Then what does the king's attorney
mean by his claim? If factually he cannot correctly be describ-
ing the real situation as to the king's legal position, at least
as it was in practice, we must give another meaning to his
words. He may be "above law' in tje sense that he need not
follow the perfectly ordinary processes which the law provides
for the average litigant, but he is not so far above the law that
it makes no difference to him, as the very fact of his involve-
ment in a court of law indicates.
Coupled with the other evidence about the standing prac-
tices of kings in their courts, we must be content at this point
to say that he is somewhere in between the ordinary and the
absolutely superior, and take the claim of his attorney as
being a sort of emotive general argument, definitely biased
towards the interests of his master, much as one sees in trials
of our own day.
Another case under Edward I is of some interest regard-
ing this sort of claim for royal legal supremacy, this time
made by a private litigant. In the Hilary term of 1292, Ha-
wise, the wife of Griffith, prayed for the restoration of cer-
tain lands taken from her in wartime.90 The lands were
allegedly given to Hawise by her husband as dower in accord-
ance with a charter granted to the husband which would
allow him to make the appropriate grant. Hawise claimed
that Griffith assigned the lands to her when "she gave him
her troth", and Henry confirmed the deed by a charter, which
she produced in the litigation.9' She admitted that Griffith
had no other lands in England, and the king's attorney pro-
ceeded to make much of this, in that he alleged that "it is
contained in the Great Charter of the lord king that a woman
ought not after her husband's death be dowered save in the
third part of the lands which belonged to her husband or of
less .... ,92 Such a grant, then, giving as dower a parcel of
land which does not bear this fractional relationship with
90. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING3S BENCH, Selden Society,
Volume 57, p. 67 (1938).
91. Id., pp. 67-68.
92. Id., p. 68.
[Vol. 24
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other lands held by the giver is "entirely contrary to the
common law, neither ought the royal grant, made upon this, to
hold or be valid, especially as the lord king had no wish by
that grant to change the common law of his realm."
93
Hawise stated, rather redundantly, that she was ready
to prove that she received the land as dower, the defining
of which was at the heart of the royal attorney's objections,
and then, as if to show these matters irrelevant, alleged that
the king was "above all law".
94
As always appears to be the case, one can only conjecture
as to how much of each party's agreement was adopted by the
judges in their decision, but seemingly nothing submitted by
Hawise persuaded them. We find the case closed with "after-
wards, before day was given to the aforesaid Hawise, she
withdrew from her petition after she was solemnly called in
court. Therefore, it was awarded that the aforesaid Hawise
be in mercy". 95
If this is all there is to be said of the case, it seems
almost inescapable that, if the grant of land in such a manner
was contrary to common law requirements concerning dower,
the king could do nothing to overcome this even by charter.
Though charters concerning the king are subject to interpre-
tation by him alone,96 as our general rule says, it may be that
his interpretation is needed only when it could conceivably
in some way render a transaction proper according to the
common law, but will prove useless when the only purpose of
the charter would be contrary to that law. Here again we
seem to find the king limited in his indirect interference with
93. Id. See Volume 55, p. 132. Here a charter was put forward by the
prior of Malton in a suit against him in manorial court for a debt. The charter
granted him the liberty to be free from suit save before the king or his
justices. The plaintiff, Richard, claimed that the king's charter should not be
prejudicial to him, "inasmuch as the lord king does not grant save what is his
own and does not take anyone's court away from him." The record says that
the charter was shown to the king "because it does not belong to anyone to
adjudge or in any way interpret the charters of the lord king's predecessors
except the lord king alone." The judges in 1292 were certainly willing to come
to judgment without the king. See n.66, supra. But the king here interpreted
the charter so as to allow the suit in the court baron, the seemingly clear
liberty granted therein notwithstanding.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id., Volume 58, p. xlvii; R. V. TuRNER, TxE KING AND HiS COURTS,
p. 39 (1st Ed. 1968).
26
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss2/2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REvIEw
common law applied in litigation.97 Naturally we must recog-
nize that the interference which a royal act would have worked
here is indirect, and this is somewhat differnt from a situation
in which the king directly orders justices to do something.98
But nonetheless, the king hardly seems to be "above all law"
in any literal sense, for otherwise the mere identification of
the grant as a royal one would have settled the matter in this
case. One could make so bold as to say that there seems to
have been no single interpretation of the facts or expressions
of interests, on behalf of the crown which here would have
altered the effects of the common law, lest the judges would
have called on the king. But this seems to swing to the
opposite extreme and attribute too much resiliance to the
common law, which, as we have seen, must admittedly recog-
nize the king as a very special person. One gets the feeling
that all parties during this time align at will with either of
two 'factions'-the common law on one hand, and the crown
on the other-and the pursuit of rival interests seems to
insure some opposition between each of these two forces. All
thus seem to strive for a sort of balance, though none
know the rules precisely, if there be any. Let the king
be the king as he ought, and let the common law be
the common law, and let conflicts be settled as the situation
demands, so that hopefully we may someday know more
clearly what the rules really are. Though each party in the
many cases, and the judges therein, must have all had each
their own individual picture of how things stacked up between
the king and the law, the pictures were apparently all quite
different, and sometimes one side seems to push its position
as far as the graciousness or inattention of the other side
will permit. But this is, after all, much of the litigational
process in the common law system of our own times. Thus,
functionally speaking, we may here see a striking similarity,
and a rivalry between these two forces that makes the king
in many ways more a contestant than a dictator, as the some-
97. See n. 14, supra. This would fit into category three in the methods of
indirect interference by the king which Turner gives.
98. The example of judicial balking at direct intervention which occurred
in 1329 always seems to serve to demonstrate that perhaps the time comes
when the difference between direct and indirect interference may not mean
very much. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KINGs BENCE, Selden Society,
Volume 76, p. lxxxv (1957).
[Vol. 24
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times extreme claims for royal authority would falsely have
us believe.
Another fascinating case occurred under the next king,
Edward II, at the beginning of his reign in 1308.19 Therein
it was alleged that William de Braose and Henry of Whiteway
had levied a fine in 1285 with respect to the manors of Wash-
ington Sedgwick, and Findon. The fine stated that William
acknowledged the manors, with advowsons and appurten-
ances, belong to Henry in return for Henry's grant of such to
hold for his life for certain services. After William's decease,
the manors were to go to William's son, Richard, and the heirs
of his body to be held forever by the same services. But if
Richard were to die without heirs begotten of his body, the
manors were to go to Peter, Richard's brother, and the heirs
of his body forever.
William de Braose had levied another fine in 1280 with
one Amice de Ripariis with respect to the manors of Ches-
worth, Grinstead, and Bidlington, on the same terms as the
fine between himself and Henry of Whiteway. 00 Peter,
William's son, sued complaining that William de Braose the
younger, his older brother, and Mary, the widow of William
the older, had taken the manors of Washington and Findon,
treated in the fine of 1285, and Grinstead, treated in the
fine of 1280.
The sheriff was ordered by writs to let William and
Mary know that they should come before the king and answer
for this. Mary first appeared and claimed to hold the lands
by dower, and, after some delay, William appeared and prayed
that the fines should not be executed as Peter had asked. He
alleged that his father had died seised of all the contested
manors, and the king's escheator had seized the manors,
reserving the rights of all interested. William also alleged
that he had sued as son and heir of William the older, to
have the seisin in the manors placed in him, which was done.
He then endowed Mary from the lands. Thereafter, Richard
came complaining that the terms of the fines had not been
observed, and sued in the king's court. The king was con-
cerned that the success of Richard's action would work a dis-
99. Id., Volume 74, p. 7.
00. Id., p. 8.
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memberment of the barony' 0 ' to which the lands belonged,
and would have preferred that William and his heirs hold the
lands intact. So an agreement was reached between William
and Richard before the king and his council, 02 with the king's
consent. Under the terms of the agreement, the king's valuers
were to value everything pertaining to the barony and another
manor. If the other manor was of sufficient value, it was to
be given to Richard in return for the lands in the barony, with
a provision that certain other additional lands would be given
if it was insufficient. William and Richard agreed not to
thereafter institute any claim or proceeding contrary to the
rights of the other party as agreed upon, and all gave security.
The terms of this agreement were enrolled in an "ordinance
and provision" on the rolls of the king's council.' 03 The lands
101. It seems that the division of barionies, often a question in the settle-
ment of inheritances, was always of interest to the king. R. V. TURNER, THE
KING AND His COURTS, p. 53 (1st Ed. 1968). The 1308 case states that such
a division "would clearly be to the prejudice of his demesne." SELEcr CASES
IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH, Selden Society, Volume 74, p. 10 (1955).
102. As discussed earlier, this a procedural expedient reserved for the
most important cases, or those most directly affecting the interests of the king
in some way. See n. 47, supra. Perhaps the king was specifically interested in
the parties or the particular manors in question. It could be that the subject of
these divisions was one which Edward considered to be generally important
enough to involve himself or his council.
103. SELEcT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH, Selden Society,
Volume 58, pp. xi-xiv, especially p. xi, n. 3 (1939). Relating to the term
'ordinance and provision', it seems that it was earlier on equated with statutes,
assizes or other pronouncements of law. Sayles says, however, that by the time
of Edward I, the term statute had come to embody whatever notion of special
'legislation' or lawmaking that existed. The distinctions between forms of law
that people valued as having any significance during this time were based on
differences in the practical results achieved by different legal forms. When we
seek to answer the question of whether or not the term 'ordinance and pro-
vision' had any special legal significance or constituted a legal pronouncement of
any more weight than pronouncements in court, at least so far as the prerogative
is concerned, we seem to find no definite answer. The king's involvement in the
process would it seems be of more significance than the peculiar force of a
special sort of law, styled 'ordinance and provision'.
For our purposes analysing these cases according to conventional ideas
about the prerogative generally seems to be more adequate than to attempt an
evaluation of the various legal pronouncements based upon supposedly different
sorts of law. This approach is further confirmed by the fact that the source
of the prerogative and of statutory law are at this time the same anyway. See
p. xxxviii. The personality of the parliament had not yet forced distinctions
which would cause us to vary our analysis because of the legal nomenclature
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given to Richard were to be held on the same terms as the
original fines. After seisin in the substituted lands was
delivered to Richard, an indenture was made between William,
Mary, Richard, and Peter in order "to make what had been
done more secure.""1 4 The indenture stated that Richard
relinquished all claim whatsoever in the contested manors, in
return for which the substituted lands were acknowledged to
belong to Richard, and to be held in accordance with the
earlier fines.
After Richard died without heirs, Peter came into pos-
session of the substituted lands because they were held in
accordance with the terms of the order fine. William alleged
that Peter had thereby accepted and ratified the agreement
and indenture, and prayed whether Peter could demand the
tenements mentioned in the fines, thus effectively contraven-
ing both the agreement made before the king and his council,
embodied in the ordinance and provision, and the indenture.
Peier replied that the agreement, which was based on
the indenture, was made after the ordinance and provision,
thus making the latter of no effect. Further, he was under
age at the time the indenture was made, and was not even a
party to the ordinance and provision. Thus he contended that
he held the lands then in his possession as something merely
acquired by Richard through the indenture, but the aforesaid
fines should nonetheless still be in force. Should he be ex-
cluded from the benefits of those fines because of the later
made agreement to which he was not a party?
The court could not have been too pleased with his almost
persuasive but uncomfortable argument, and appreciated the
impropriety of having one's cake and eating it too, for they
then asked him about the exact nature of his claim to the
lands he held through Richard at the time of the suit. Peter
then definitely seems to have retraced his steps, for he then
involved. See p. xiv. See also S. E. THORNE, A DISCOURSE UPON THE STAT-
uTEs, pp. 3-100.
We may, however, take the legal action involved in this case as a
reliable and sincere expression of the royal interest, due to the relative im-
portance of problems treated by this procedure. Nothing, however, indicates
that the use of an 'ordinance and provision' involves a power reaching beyond
the prerogative.
104. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH, Selden Society,
Volume 74, p. 13 (1955).
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offered what one senses was a timidly delivered response,
"stating he held by the fines."10 5
William was pushed to argument about the legal effects
of the procedural juxtaposition of the various transactions.
He contended that the agreement was made by authority of
the provision, which was itself "made before the king and his
council and agreed to by the king . . . and enrolled in the
council rolls, and this provision, made with such solemnity in
the presence of the king himself, ought to be considered and
held to be of greater authority and effect than any fine levied
in his court, especially when the execution of the fine has
not been brought into effect."'10 6
Further, Peter possesses his lands by virtue of the inden-
ture, thus "accepting and confirming the provision and ordi-
nance, etc."'
107
The king seems to have been perplexed by the possibilities
raised by this case, in that he then sent letters under his privy
seal ordering Roger le Brabezon and his fellows, and justices
holding pleas before him to adjourn all cases involving fines
until the next parliament.108
The record of the case terminates with the narration of
many adjournments, but no court imposed solution is revealed.
Seemingly the case was settled by the parties.
The implications of such a case, as indicated before, can
be analysed by a conjunctive evalution of the pronouncements
or allegations therein, the procedural expedients employed,
and the positions which the ultimate outcome seems to vindi-
cate. Here we have an unresolved procedural problem which
could be critical to our assessment of the case. That is, Peter
has claimed that the indenture amounted to a nullification
of the ordinance and provision made before it, and William
has contended that the indenture confirmed the ordinance and
105. The reversal of Peter's position is recorded unemotionally on the
same page:
"[H]e now holds Tetbury manor.. as something acquired by
Richard, his brother, in accordance with the terms of that
indenture etc."
"And he says [after the question was put to him by the judges
concerning his current title] that is by virtue of the fine."
Id., p. 14.
106. Id., pp. 14-15.
107. Id., p. 15.
108. Id.
[Vol. 24
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provision, and was wholly in accord with it. The exact effect
of these two acts one upon the other is not determined. But
a deeper look into the case indicates that these parties knew
that arguments thereon were related to the prerogative in a
very real way. William did not solely argue that the inden-
ture was to be effective, which would have factually accom-
plished his objective. Rather, he also argued that it was in
accordance with the ordinance and provision. To have gone
only far enough to have possibly achieved his desired objective
without reckoning with the implications of the ordinance
would seem to imply that the parties could by private agree-
ment somehow modify a solemn royal pronouncement.
Further, if private parties could do this, the possibility
would exist that the alleged absence of Peter as a party to
the indenture would leave William with no secondary argu-
ment. William, however, played all his cards. He did not
even intimate that the king's wishes as expressed in the
ordinance could be thus avoided, even if doing so would tend
to confirm Peter's involvement in the later agreement, the
indenture, his inclusion in which might preclude any further
claim to the land through the older fines.
Peter also recognized the difficulty posed by the king's
involvement. Not only must he somehow opt out of the inden-
ture, but he must also use it to nullify the effects of the former
royal act. The disclaimer of the indenture regarding any
effective disposition of the contested lands, but the assertion
of its efficacy as taking procedural precedence over the ordi-
nance seems to typify the twinship of Peter's whole approach
to this case. He ultimately decided to avoid connecting his
title with the indenture, yet he insisted that it superseded
the royal ordinance and provision. He clearly recognized the
difficulty which the royal act made subsequent to the trans-
action upon which he rested his claim to title, the fines, posed
to the effectuation of those fines. His insistence on avoiding
any effect of the royal act may indicate that Peter felt that
such a subsequently created ordinance could upset the private
transactions, even if he was no party to the ordinance. A
mere indenture could not, however, produce such a result
unless he were a party thereto. It thus offered Peter a step-
pingstone over which to escape the royal act. Just how the
previous fines would be revived is not clear. That is, why
were they not superseded by the ordinance, just as he claimed
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was itself superseded by the indenture? Is Peter arguing
that in such cases there must be some sort of private acquies-
cence to the royal act, expressed in conventional legal terms,
before that royal act may upset a purely private transaction?
The very assumption that the fines still somehow exist after
the ordinance and that William must base his defense on the
indenture and not the ordinance seem to make such a conten-
tion implicit in Peter's argument.
The converse seems to be implicit in William's arguments.
The solemn ordinance is of greater authority, period, no
matter in which order things occurred. This accords with his
argument that the indenture may only be in accord with the
ordinance, and may certainly not overrule it.
All in all, the positions of the parties on this procedural
point indicate an inconsistent approach to the scope of the
prerogative. Is this merely another case of a party claiming
extravagant powers for the king, since to do so serves his own
interests? We must notice that, despite the great value of the
lands at stake, nobody goes so far as to argue that the king
is above all law. This seems to be the common thread running
through the contentions and actions of all concerned, even
the king. No one acted as if he believed the king to be above
the law. The mere expression of his prerogative, unaided by
private acquiescence, would have settled the whole matter if
this were so. Yet no one believed the opposite extreme was
true either-that the king was only to be counted as an
ordinary party. As evidence of this, we see that Peter was
not merely conten with alleging that he was not a party to
the agreement embodied in the ordinance, as he had alleged
regarding the indenture, but felt that he also had to use a
procedural argument to somehow nullify the ordinance. He
knew royal transactions were not ordinary ones. He thus was
driven to adopt, a rather bifarious legal position before he felt
safe.
Here again, we can only allow that the king was some-
where between two extremes. But we may also again marvel
at the degree of conformity with the common law and custom
which his acts assure. Neither normal litigant, nor all power-
ful despot, he actually appears closer to the former than the
latter in the above fascinating case.
We find another interesting glance at the prerogative in
litigation under the subsequent king, Edward III. It seems
[Vol. 24
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that Robert of Clipston had sought redress in parliament in
1318 regarding the wardenship of a hospital, which was
allegedly revoked by Edward II in a manner contrary to
law.10 9 Edward III had then ratified the revocation without
knowing that Clipston had originally been removed illegally.
Apparently Clipston obtained no redress for his claim and
thus began a suit against one John Giffard in 1327 by a
petition in parliament. It was agreed that Giffard should
appear in the king's bench in the Easter term following, but
the case was somehow postponed until 1333. In that year, the
king sent a writ to the king's bench, along with the petition
Clipston had presented to him in his council in the previous
parliament, and also instructed that justice was to be done in
the case. It appears that the justices did not proceed with
Clipston's plea earlier on because they were uncertain as to
whether or not a revocation could be repealed in accordance
with the law and custom of the realm. Sir Richard Willough-
by, a justice of the king's bench, had said that he could not
proceed to judgment "unless the king and his council are
agreed that the revocation can be repealed in accordance with
the law and custom of your realm.""10 Willoughby stated also
that he surmised that the instructions by the king to the
justices were made without the knowledge of his council, and
thus Clipston prayed that the matter should be clarified to
Willoughby and that he should be clearly instructed to proceed
to judgment. The judges were instructed to hear the argu-
ments and judge according to the law and custom of the
realm "notwithstanding the revocation and letters of the
king, the father, etc.; and of the present king." In the dispute
as to whether or not John needed to specify the original
reasons for the revocation, John argued that the instructions
from the king ordering him to do so were contrary to the
109. Id., Volume 76, p. 1.
110. Id., p. 2.
111. Id., p. 3. John had alleged that he had entirely proved his case by
submitting the letters of revocation made by Edward II and the letters patent
of the present king approving the revocation. The reasons for the revocation,
he claimed, were known only to the former king, and therefore they could not
now be questioned. But Clipston contended that John should also come for-
ward and specify the precise reasons why the wardenship was revoked, and
the king in his instructions appeared to agree that such was necessary: "[T]he
justices here were instructed to inspect the collations . . . and to hear the
arguments and the specific reasons." Id.
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original writ sent from the Hilary parliament of 1327, which
was the original writ for beginning this proceeding as well
as the answer to Clipston's petition of that year. He said that
the Court should not begin anything new by the present writ
which was not warranted by parliament. Further, he stated
that the reasons for the revocation were known only to the
previous king and could not now be questioned. 112
The judges finally agreed that the revocation made by
Edward II "for particular reasons touching his royal right"1 13
still held good, and could not lawfully be repealed by judgment
of the court in accordance with law and custom, nor could the
reasons therefore be expounded.
It is certiainly a different matter for a court to overrule
the decision of a former king than to directly confront the
decision of the present one, yet the court here let the decision
stand anyway. However, they did not do so because of pres-
sure from the ruling king or because of his wish for vindica-
tion of some special interest of his own, but appear to have
been free to decide whether or not an annullment of the
revocation would be consonant with law. Indeed, the reigning
king seemed to be anxious that their decision should be based
on the law of the realm, and solicited their opinion uninflu-
enced by undue weight given to the letters of revocation
themselves. All in all we seem to have an unusual submissive-
ness displayed by the king toward the common law, though
one must candidly assume that to so act in such a case was
probably not disagreeable to him or contrary to any specific
interest of his own in the case. The judgment in the case
appears to give due weight to the special rights of the king,
and is a refusal to overturn the king's action involving private
rights. Yet again nothing indicates that the prerogative was
forcibly superimposed over the common law. Rather, the
place given to the king as a special legal person with special
rights was a part of the common law. Though this case was
chosen as an example of judicial vindication of a royal act, it is
submitted that to interpret the case as an example of judicial
timidity would be incorrect. To do so would place too much
emphasis on the bare outcome of the case, and not enough
on the reasons why it was reached.
112. Id.
113. Id., p. 5.
220 [V7ol. 24
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It is interesting to recall in this connection the way in
which Professor Sayles felt that the prerogative was accom-
modated to the common law.1 1 4 In its early history, he felt,
even the chancery dispensed the common law, rather than
some aberration of it which came to known as equity. Edward
II stated the ideal at the beginning of his reign, and, if we
may take him at his word, the interpretations of the above
cases are quite in accord with his expressed unwillingness
to displace the common law.115 To Sayles, petitions for the
king's grace, or for the exercise of his will to favor the
petitioner in some way were actually petitions to be placed
under the common law conflicts between the common law and
the prerogative could thus be lessened, though not wholly
avoided. Yet even the example which Sayles cites relative
to the extent of the prerogative in non-criminal matters sug-
gests that it had limits inherent in itself, and oftentimes the
conflict between the prerogative and the common law must
be resolved in favor of the latter, grace notwithstanding."
6
V. CONCLUSION
There is truly a danger in making too much out of
isolated incidents of litigation which occurred during a time
in which procedures and legal concepts such as jurisdiction
were themselves still so malleable that even contemporaries
were at times hard put to distinguish the permissible from
the illegal. The common case note or comment in modern law
journals contrasts certain bits of litigation with a rather
well defined larger body of law, and this illustrates their
irregularity or novelty. But in a situation where irregularity
and novelty are themselves the norm, such discriminating
contrast becomes more difficult. Yet we possess enough gen-
eral information to believe that the bits and pieces we examine
say some valuable things about the proper role of the king in
relation to the business of his courts.
114. Id., p. lxxxii.
115. Id., p. lxxxiii. Edward instructed his chancery clerks to advise the
king's bench on the manner in which a certain action was to be terminated
"saving to us our right of our prerogative and also to the defendant his right
in accordance with the common law, for it is not our intention to wrong any-
one through our prerogative but to preserve to everyone his right."
116. See the discussion of the case in 1329 in which the judges persisted
in postponement, despite clear instructions from the king to continue. N. 56,
supra.
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Considering the volume of medieval litigation, it seems
moreover to be the exception where a situation will arise
wherein the contest between the prerogative and private
interests based on the common law is drawn into sharp focus.
The very rarity of cases wherein the relative superiority of
private vis a vis crown rights is brought into direct question
indicates that the norm is a system in which the prerogative
is rather smoothly accommodated to the interests of private
litigants, and a system which makes both quite compatible.
One just does not see the king riding roughshod over private
interests, but rather friction is resolved in strikingly conven-
tional legal terms. Moreover, where the king's acts arguably
do go aganist the grain of the common law, the litigation
occasioned is at least sometimes concluded in a manner which
seems to correct the 'illegal' implications of the act within
ordinary common law processes. No fanfare or openly bitter
conflict ensues, but the king's act is in an indirect fashion
adjudged out of rhythm with the common law, and things go
on without protest from any quarter.
Much observable royal interference with litigation is
taken as a matter of course, and only on occasion are the
parties and judges openly aware that a sort of contest will
actually determine the outcome of the litigation. The ways
in which they handle themselves in these cases probably
provide some of the best information available on the narrow
question of the extent of the prerogative in litigation. Con-
trarily the often outlandish claims of private parties probably
provide some the least reliable information on the subject,
yet we must still notice that, when their arguments are con-
trary to the exercise of the prerogative, they are based upon
normal common law concepts. They visualize the possibility
of limits on the prerogative provided by the common law.
As we have seen, the actions of the judges and their
apparent reasons for acting in actual rulings probably says
more about the prerogative than any source. And, signifi-
cantly, we have seen that they have at times been openly
aware of the necessity of even the king's reckoning with the
common law. Equally important are the statements and com-
mands of the king himself, especially where the sought after
illustrative conflict between the common law and the preroga-
117. The case invloving the dower of Hawise is a good example of this.
See n. 90, supra.
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tive can be seen in a judicial reluctance to obey those com-
mands.
We also have extreme claims made for the extent of the
prerogative by the king's own representatives, 118 but we are
probably justified in placing these in much the same category
as the self-serving allegations of private litigants. They are
often so extreme as to be obviously incorrect and valueless
when taken literally. Further, where we see such extreme
allegations made by a private suitor on one occasion, we find
a striking example wherein the judges seem in their ruling to
allow for no conceivable interpretation of the prerogative
which would modify the operation of a clear common law rule,
with which the claimants position conflicts. 119
Even where the king himself is concerned, we see him
perplexed about the effects of his prerogative on the common
law, and wholly unwilling to press his position without know-
ing what the law allows. 20 We see him willing to accord the
common law whatever weight it will command in the face
of a contrary royal act. 21 The judges themselves have from
time to time made certain remarkably direct statements about
the effects of the prerogative as opposed to the common law,
as in 1242, when a royal writ contrary to the common law
was dismissed. 122 We see them seeming to bow their necks
at royal commands contrary to well defined common law, as
the example of 1329 illustrates. 123
Over all, we have the analysis made by those who have
taken a thorough look at the predecessors of the Edwards,
118. See n. 74, supra.
119. See n. 91, sizpra.
120. See n. 108, smtpra.
121. See n. 109, supra (albeit the willingness was expressed regarding the
contrary act of a predecessor king).
122. See n. 55, mipra.
123. SELECr CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH, Selden Society
Volume 76, p. lxxxv (1957). Perhaps it may be said that the resistance which
the judges were willing to pose to the royal will was fairly directly dependent
upon the compelling nature of the common law rule concerned in each case.
Earlier in 1294, the judges of the king's bench had refused to take proof of the
age of an individual who was obviously a minor, as her appearance in court
showed. Yet their hesitancy was remedied by a royal order to proceed, and
proof was taken. Id., Volume 58, p. liii. Or perhaps the difference in the results
of 1294 and 1329 may be accounted for by the differences in the personalities of
the different monarchs ruling in those years. See n. 127, infra. Or perhaps the
common law itself had 'toughened up' quite a bit between those years, though
this doesn't seem a likely answer.
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and are assured by one of these that the exercise of the prerog-
ative by kings at least as far back as John did not work to
overhaul the judicial system, but rather was in accord with
it.124 John seems to be the king most willing to intervene
in jurdicial business through his prerogative, and the most
concerned with the economic benefits accruing from its exer-
cise. 125 He is apparently the only king moved to claim that
his will should take precedence over custom. 126 Yet neither he
nor his son, says Turner, offered any massive interference
with the operation of the common law, or provided any test
case illustrating the sheer supremacy of the royal will over it.
Indeed, the tradition by the time of Edward I seems not to
have been one of an obsequious common law, wholly bent to
the will of an egotistic king, but rather appears to have been
one of a vital, growing common law, of which rules are very
observant. Naturally this tradition cannot ignore the force
of the personality of each individual monarch, and we must in
part agree with Sayle's statement that the prerogative of the
king was just about as elastic as his personality.1 27 Yet we
are compelled to admit the persistence of the common law,
even when confronted by a highhanded monarch. Thus Sayle's
statement cannot be taken to admit to absolute elasticity of
power, for he also admits to ultimate limits on the preroga-
tive in the very general, undocumented statement that the
privileges exercised by the monarch must not "fly directly
in the face of justice, or deprive his subjects of their rights
under the common law."'1
28
So even though evidence which will suggest the exact
degree of interference with the common law which the king
may not exceed is very skimpy, much suggests the general
personality of the common law as a viable counterbalance to
the prerogative. Moreover, on the other side of the coin, those
who would argue otherwise are in a much more difficult posi-
tion, since we find no real examples of the king being "above
124. R. V. TURNER, THE KING AND His COURTS, pp. 119-120 (1st Ed.
1968).
125. Id., p. 276.
126. Id., p. 105.
127. SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF THE KING'S BENCH, Selden Society,
Volume 58, p. xliii (1939). This accords with the marked difference in the
approach used by John and that which Edward II professed to follow. Id.,
Volume 76, p. Lxxxiii.
128. Id., p. xliv.
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law", as some old cases and new theorists suggest. We simply
never hear the king stating that pleading and procedural
norms are irrelevant to him. Rather, evidence points to the
persistence of the common law in the minds of the judges as
a limit to the prerogative. The incident in 1242 has its coun-
terpart in later times. To attempt to state, however, from
such a case as that involving Hawise and her charter attempt-
ing to modify dower rules,' 29 that no royal act can modify
the common law emasculates the royal prerogative too much.
The legal climate of this period seems to be somewhere in
between the two extremes discussd above, between an abso-
lutely independent judiciary and a wholly subjugated one.
Law and the prerogative appear in this system much more as
companions than antagonistic forces, whether we say that the
king does not wish to override the common law rights of his
subjects, as did Edward II, or that he can not do so. The
argument may not be far off that any unyielding exercise of
the prerogative in a manner directly contrary to the common
law, even in private litigation, rather than the granting of
royal grace to alleviate the effects of the prerogative, is the
real aberration in the fabric of medieval law.
129. See n. 91, supra.
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